Issuer
- Does
- Declares liabilities, integrates the mint hook, pays coverage fees.
- Holds
- Registration, bonded collateral, no vote over its own ceiling.
- Cannot
- Supply price, attest custody, or be a verifier.
00 Protocol specification · draft v0.9 · 26 October 2026
Ztakora is the collateral sufficiency layer for on-chain liabilities.
It computes the largest liability an issuer may put on-chain right now — from collateral that has actually been attested, stressed by the time it would take to sell. The number is live, it decays when evidence goes stale, and the contract refuses issuance above it.
A specification, not an offering. No token exists, no contract is under audit, and the figures in the worked example are illustrative inputs rather than a live deployment. Everything that is a claim about the outside world is sourced at the end.
What is true today
01 At a glance
Tokenised assets have grown far faster than the machinery that proves they are covered. The industry answer is the reserve attestation: a periodic statement that at one instant, assets matched liabilities. Ztakora replaces the statement with a limit. It asks a different question — how much may this issuer put on-chain today, given what has been proven, how good it is, and how long it would take to sell? — answers it every epoch, and puts the answer where it binds: in the contract that mints.
The ceiling is recomputed each epoch from rolling evidence. Nothing expires into a grace period where the old number keeps working.
Stale evidence multiplies the ceiling down by itself. No committee has to notice a problem and vote to act before protection ends.
Haircuts come from a liquidation horizon and market depth, not a fixed percentage applied to every asset class alike.
The issuer's contract calls the network before it creates. Above the line the call reverts, so an over-issue has to be a deliberate bypass.
The gap the specification is aimed at
The category split is where the risk concentrates: tokenised Treasuries ≈$15.7bn, credit ≈$8.0bn, commodities ≈$4.9bn as of September 2026 [R3]. The first is nearly a load line already — short-dated, deep, one day to unwind. The other two are where h and q do all the work, and they are the fastest-growing part of the book. Trackers disagree on totals by more than a factor of three depending on whether stablecoins and bridged duplicates are counted; Appendix C cites the range rather than the flattering number.
02 The problem
Proof-of-reserves was the right instinct and the wrong instrument. It answers were you covered when we looked, at a date chosen in advance, using a valuation supplied by the party being measured. Three properties make it reporting rather than protection, and all three survive a good auditor.
The failure state is not fraud. It is a solvent issuer on the day of the snapshot and illiquid on the day of the redemption queue.
For the limit to bind, five properties have to hold simultaneously. Each one has a corresponding mechanism later in this document, and each mechanism is named where it appears.
| Forward-looking | The limit applies to the next issuance, not the last report. | §04 Ceiling |
|---|---|---|
| Continuous | Recomputed on a schedule nobody can choose. | §05 Epoch |
| Independently sourced | No single party supplies both sides of the comparison. | §06 Three classes |
| Time-stressed | Value discounted by how hard the asset is to exit. | §04.2 Haircut |
| Self-removing | Evidence that ages stops counting without anyone deciding. | §05.3 Decay |
The honest caveat. A limit computed from attested inputs is only as good as the attestation. Ztakora does not make false statements impossible; it makes them expensive, detectable, and short-lived, and it removes the benefit of the doubt when evidence stops arriving. §11 states this as a risk rather than a solved problem.
03 Foundations
Written to make the design falsifiable. A change to any of these is not a parameter update — it is a different protocol, and it should be argued as one.
The network's only output is a number per issuer per epoch. There is no "verified" state an issuer can put on a website. Anything that can be displayed on a marketing page will be optimised for the marketing page.
A warning attached to a mint is a document nobody reads at the moment it matters. The default enforcement point is a revert. Warnings exist, but for operators, not as the protection.
Any single attestation class going silent, stale or adverse lowers the ceiling. It never takes agreement to reduce protection and it always takes agreement to raise it. Asymmetric by construction.
Security is paid for from the fee an issuer saves by not having to convince a counterparty one at a time. Inflation to buy participation would price the network to grow rather than to be right.
A token-weighted vote on a haircut constant is a request for the largest holder to set it. Every parameter change carries a required evidence pack — §10.
An uncapped backstop is a promise the network cannot keep. Every guaranteed figure has a hard ceiling above which it says "shortfall", and says it in the contract output.
Inputs, weights, and the arithmetic are published each epoch with the result. An analyst who disagrees can recompute the number rather than argue about the report.
03.1 Explicit non-goals
The ceiling uses observable market quantities — price, depth, time-to-sell — and legal facts about custody. It does not opine on whether an issuer is well run. An investment-grade issuer with unauditable custody gets a low ceiling and a fair one.
Ztakora never holds, keys, moves or freezes an asset. Custody stays with the issuer's regulated custodian; the network only records whether it proved to exist.
No order flow, no price discovery, no listing decisions. The network has one output and it is a limit.
The backstop is a capped, loss-bearing reserve for a defined settlement failure, not a product that returns to depositors. Backers can lose their stake; holders can be paid short.
Nothing here is an offer of a security, an invitation to invest, or a promise of future network access. A token specification appears in §08 because the mechanism needs one to bond — not because one is being distributed.
Enforceability of the underlying claim is an input qa, weighted by counsel opinion per jurisdiction. Where the legal chain is broken the number goes toward zero, which is the honest answer, not a workaround for it.
04 The load line
This is the whole protocol in a line of arithmetic. Everything after §05 exists to feed it honestly and to make its output bind.
A haircut should answer one question: if this issuer has to unwind position a starting today, how much of its value does the unwinding itself destroy? That is a function of volatility, of how long the position takes to exit, and of how thick the market is while it is being exited. So the network computes it as:
ha = min ( zp · σa · √Ta + λ · ( Pa ⁄ Da0.5 ) , hcap )
| zp | Stress quantile of the return distribution at confidence p (baseline 99%, 1-day). |
|---|---|
| σa | Realised volatility of the asset over a 126-day window, expressed as a one-day figure — the contract computes zp·σ·√T against a horizon counted in days, so an annualised σ here would silently divide every haircut by √365. |
| Ta | Liquidation horizon: days in which ≤ 25% of average daily volume can be absorbed, scaled to the position size. |
| Pa | Position value the issuer would need to realise at once. |
| Da | Depth: two-sided liquidity within 100 bps, sampled at the epoch. |
| λ | Impact coefficient, per asset class, fitted from realised execution slippage. Governance-gated, §10. |
| hcap | Hard ceiling at 0.60. Beyond that the asset is ineligible rather than heavily discounted. |
The square root in the volatility term is the standard √t-time scaling and is deliberately conservative for assets whose returns autocorrelate — private credit, insurance-linked notes, anything without a continuous tape. Where the tape does not exist, σ is inherited from the nearest observable proxy and the inheritance is recorded as its own evidence item, so a reader can see that a haircut borrowed from a proxy rather than measured.
Diversification is worth something at the moment of a forced sale, so it is priced into the ceiling rather than praised in a policy document. Using the share of each asset class in the covered book:
ci = min ( hmax , γ · (Hi − Htarget)+ ) where Hi = Σa wa2
H is the Herfindahl index of the collateral book, so 1⁄n for an even book of n classes and 1 for a single-class book. The penalty is zero at or below the target Htarget = 0.30 and rises from there; with γ = 0.35 a book that is entirely one asset class takes c = 0.245, so cmax = 0.40 never binds under the default sensitivity — it is a guardrail against a future gate raising γ above 0.57, not a term that does work today. Stating which parameters are inert is part of publishing them.
| Book | Composition | Σ weighted covered | ci | Ceiling |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | $100m T-bills only | $97.90m | 0.245 | $73.9m |
| B | $50m bills + $50m corporate | $95.55m | 0.070 | $88.9m |
| C | $40m bills + $35m corporate + $25m gold | $95.68m | 0.016 | $94.2m |
| Identical $100m of face value, and B and C carry slightly less covered value than A because corporate credit and gold haircut harder than bills. They still support 20% and 27% more issuable liability than A — entirely because the book is spread, which is the whole argument for pricing concentration separately. | ||||
The numbers here are inputs chosen to make the shape of the mechanism visible, not a description of any live issuer. The calculator below recomputes them from your own assumptions.
04.4 Interactive
Change the collateral book and watch the ceiling, the freeboard and the mint decision recompute from the same arithmetic the contract runs. Nothing here is a saved state; reload and it returns to Book C above.
Recomputed on every input change from L = Σ V(1−h)q × (1−c).
05 Evidence
An epoch is 24 hours, aligned to host-chain block height rather than wall-clock, so the schedule cannot be chosen by whoever benefits from a different Tuesday.
The manifest is the only step the issuer performs alone, and it is the step with no authority: a declaration that contradicts the other three classes does not raise the ceiling, it collapses it. The asymmetry is the design.
| Artefact | liability-manifest/<epoch>.json |
|---|---|
| Required from | Issuer |
| Failure mode | Absent → ceiling is the prior epoch's, decayed by one |
| Latency budget | ≤ 40 blocks |
The factor q is not a switch. Each attestation class carries its own grace period, after which its contribution decays geometrically per epoch until it reaches zero. Nothing is revoked, no committee decides, and the issuer cannot stall the decay by disputing it.
| Class | Grace | Decay/epoch | Effectively zero at |
|---|---|---|---|
| Price and depth | 1 epoch | ×0.50 | epoch +6 |
| On-chain reserve proof | 2 epochs | ×0.70 | epoch +11 |
| Custodian confirmation | 6 epochs | ×0.85 | epoch +28 |
| Counsel enforceability opinion | 90 epochs | ×0.93 | epoch +140 |
The ordering is the point: fast-moving quantities must be re-proved quickly and slow-moving legal facts are allowed to age, which means an issuer can keep operating through a weekend and cannot keep operating through a month of silence.
A ceiling commits when verifiers holding at least two-thirds of the bonded voting stake agree within tolerance — a maximum relative spread of 1.5% between their independent computations. Below that the epoch does not commit and the prior ceiling decays.
The last item is a deliberate reduction in capability. A system that can rescue an issuer can also decline to, and the discretion involved would need governance — which §03 rules out as an input to protection.
06 Participants
The role separation exists to make one specific failure expensive: an issuer producing its own evidence. It is not a policy preference, it is why q is a product of independent terms.
07 Architecture
Deliberately minimal: the network computes a number and a contract refuses a transaction. Anything more ambitious is a different product.
A Solidity and Vyper interface, one Rust binding, one Move binding. requireCeiling(amount) resolves against the committed ceiling for the epoch, atomically with the mint. Fails closed: no reachable ceiling, no issuance.
Per-issuer, per-epoch committed Li with the input hash. Read-only for issuers, writeable only through quorum commit. Holds the decay clock, the breach ledger, and the capped reserve's remaining capacity.
Bonded set, blind submission, aggregate signature over the computed result. Runs §04 locally from the published pack; the network does not trust a verifier's arithmetic, it checks that a sample of them reproduce it.
Three separate transports, deliberately not unified: on-chain Merkle proofs, an out-of-band signed channel for custodians and counsel, and market data with its own provenance. Unifying them would create the single point §06 exists to avoid.
Every input, weight, computation and result, published and reproducible forever. This is where a disagreement becomes an argument with evidence in it rather than a claim about a black box.
| Verifier network down | No commit. Ceiling holds at the prior epoch and decays. Issuance keeps working until it doesn't. |
|---|---|
| Market feed stale | q for price decays by ×0.5 per epoch. A one-day outage is a meaningful cut, not a halt. |
| Custodian silent | Grace 6 epochs, then decay. Long enough for a holiday, too short for a problem. |
| Origin archive lost | Historic packs reproduce from host-chain commitments; the archive is a convenience, not the authority. |
| Registry compromised | Issuance is refused, not authorised, by a wrong low value. A wrong high value is the attack, and it needs a quorum of bonded stake — which is why the bond is sized against the ceiling it can misstate. |
Ztakora holds no assets, executes no transfers, and settles nothing itself. It is a measurement and refusal service: the smallest amount of trust that still has teeth. Two consequences are worth stating plainly rather than hiding.
First, a holder who never checks the ceiling can still be repaid short — the mechanism protects the issuer's contract, not a counterparty who ignores it. Integration is therefore aimed at issuance platforms, not at end users, and §09.3 sets an adoption gate out of that fact.
Second, the fee is paid by the party whose limit is being enforced. That is normal for compliance infrastructure and it is still a conflict, so the price the issuer pays buys a computation it cannot influence rather than a judgement it can shop for. Where that distinction fails, §10 makes the evidence public.
Two view functions and one require. The protocol's power is proportionate to how little it can ask of an issuer's contract — anything larger gets bypassed, and §11.7 is the honest consequence.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.24;
interface IZtakoraRegistry {
/// @notice The committed load line for `issuer`, valid until the next commit.
/// @return line Maximum liability that may be outstanding, in base units.
/// @return epoch Host block height at which the value was committed.
function loadLine(address issuer) external view returns (uint256 line, uint32 epoch);
/// @notice Freeboard remaining, so a frontend can show headroom without arithmetic.
function freeboard(address issuer) external view returns (int256 headroom, bool over);
}
abstract contract CeilingGuarded {
error ABOVE_LOAD_LINE(uint256 requested, uint256 line);
error STALE_EPOCH(uint32 committed, uint32 required);
IZtakoraRegistry private immutable _registry;
uint32 internal _maxEpochAge = 2; // fail closed, but cache the last line
/// The ceiling is read atomically with the mint. No oracle round-trip, no
/// off-chain check an operator can choose to skip under load.
function _requireCeiling(uint256 outstandingAfter) internal view {
(uint256 line, uint32 epoch) = _registry.loadLine(address(this));
if (block.number - uint256(epoch) > _maxEpochAge) revert STALE_EPOCH(epoch, block.number);
if (outstandingAfter > line) revert ABOVE_LOAD_LINE(outstandingAfter, line);
}
}| Read is a view, not a pull | The issuer never asks permission to mint and never receives a signature to verify. A permission call is a dependency; a number in storage is not. |
|---|---|
| _maxEpochAge = 2 | An issuer keeps operating through two missed commits, then halts. §11.8's "degrades to no new issuance" is this line, not a policy. |
| Reverts carry values | requested and line are in the error, so an operator debugging a refusal at 3am does not have to reconstruct the epoch from an archive. |
| No admin function | There is nothing here to upgrade, pause or override. The registry is the upgradeable component and it is behind the §10 timelock. |
Every argument in §02 assumes a human counterparty who reads something. That assumption is already eroding: issuance platforms are being wired to act on behalf of a treasury, a hedging routine, or an agent that decides to mint at a hour when the risk committee is asleep. Payment and authorisation rails for machine-initiated settlement are the fastest moving part of this market, and they are being built before the limits that should contain them.
A limit is the only control that survives that transition intact. Disclosure depends on someone reading it. An attestation depends on someone remembering it expires. A warning depends on someone choosing to heed it. A revert depends on nothing but the arithmetic, and it is the same revert whether the caller is a treasury desk, a solver bot, or an agent with a payment channel and no supervisor.
Which produces the strongest argument for building this now rather than later, and also the sharpest risk in the specification:
08 Economics
Security funded by the thing it protects, with no inflation leg. If the network is only worth protecting what already pays for it, that is a finding, not a flaw.
Issuers pay per epoch on outstanding attested liability, quoted annualised so it can be compared with what the same issuer already pays an auditor and a custodian.
| Tier | Test | Annualised | Per epoch |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 | h ≤ 5%, horizon ≤ 1 day, all three classes current | 8 bps | 0.022 bps |
| Tier 2 | h ≤ 12%, horizon ≤ 5 days | 16 bps | 0.044 bps |
| Tier 3 | h ≤ 30%, or any inherited σ | 27 bps | 0.074 bps |
| Tier 4 | h > 30%, capped tranche | 35 bps | 0.096 bps |
| A $500m Tier-2 book pays roughly $800k a year. The same issuer's current annual cost for a periodic attestation, counsel opinion and custodian reporting is not materially lower, which is the honest comparison and the reason the fee is per-epoch rather than per-mint. | |||
No fee per transaction, no fee per holder, no fee taken from a redemption. Charging the mint would tax activity; charging the epoch prices the service actually delivered, which is a continuously valid limit.
| Verifiers | 55% | per correctly-reproduced epoch |
|---|---|---|
| Backstop accretion | 20% | builds the capped reserve |
| Attestation channel | 15% | paid to the attester class, disclosed |
| Protocol treasury | 10% | upgrades, archive, incident cost |
Verifiers and backers must bond. The sizing rule is the one worth arguing about: bonded stake must exceed the aggregate ceiling the verifier set can misstate in a single epoch, by a factor of at least 1.2. If a quorum could wrongly raise a ceiling by $40m, the stake exposed to getting it wrong must be at least $48m — so the profitable attack requires buying more than the damage it does.
One token, PLM, exists for two purposes and no others: it is the unit in which verifier and backer bonds are posted, and the instrument in which fee claims are settled. It is not a gas token — gas belongs to the host chain — and it is not a claim on revenue in the way equity is.
This is the weakest section of the specification and it knows it. A network with no emissions and no sale has no obvious way to acquire its first bonded stake without a counterparty that already believes in the fee. §09.4 states the minimum viable bootstrap; anything more confident than that would be a pitch.
09 The capped guarantee
The ceiling is prevention. This section is what happens when prevention is wrong, and it is deliberately smaller than readers expect.
Reserve target is 5% of aggregate committed ceiling with a hard maximum of 12%. That number is not a safety estimate — it is the largest multiple of historical stressed loss the fee stream can plausibly rebuild within four quarters. A reserve that cannot be rebuilt after being drained is not a reserve.
The list is short because the guarantee is small. A backstop that covers "whatever happened" would be priced like an insurer, licensed like one, and — at 12% of ceiling — would not be one.
The mechanism protects an issuer's contract, so its value depends entirely on integrators. Phase 3 does not open until three independent conditions hold, measured rather than asserted:
The second condition matters more than it looks. A ceiling that issuers cannot live with is a ceiling that gets bypassed, so the bootstrap target is a network that is inconvenient to break and easy to degrade — the opposite of the usual launch posture.
10 Governance
Every constant in §04 and §05 is a parameter. A parameter change is admissible only when the pack below is complete and public. Quorum ratifies that the evidence is present; it does not ratify the evidence.
Hard-coded, outside the gate, and therefore outside anyone's reach:
Token-weighted voting over a haircut constant hands the pricing of risk to whoever holds the most of the instrument that bears it least. Verifier-weighted voting over the same constant hands it to whoever is paid to compute it, which is closer but still a preference disguised as arithmetic.
So the design removes the decision rather than moving it: the question a parameter change has to answer is empirical, and where the evidence does not answer it, the incumbent value stays. That is a real cost — this protocol will be slower to change than one that votes — and it is taken on purpose, because the thing being changed is a safety limit.
11 Risk register
Each row is the mitigation class it uses — remove, cap, detect, recover — because "monitoring" is not a mitigation and is not listed anywhere in this document.
| # | Risk | Class | Treatment | Residual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11.1 | Attester collusion. A custodian confirms assets that do not exist. | cap | No single attester's word above q=0.55 for any asset; two classes needed; false statement is a slashable event for the verifier set that signed it. Detection is disclosure of the fee relationship, not loyalty. | High. Unavoidable. Stated in §02 as the honest caveat. |
| 11.2 | Procyclical haircuts. Quiet markets make h small, which raises ceilings right before liquidity disappears. | remove | Ceiling uses the 126-day maximum of the haircut rather than its current value, and depth is sampled at stress percentiles. A calm tape cannot lower the line's floor. | Medium. Costs headroom in good times, which is the point. |
| 11.3 | Legal non-enforceability. The claim on the asset is not enforceable in the issuer's jurisdiction. | detect | Counsel opinion is its own evidence item with 90-epoch grace; a withdrawn opinion decays q without waiting for anything else. | Medium. Depends on counsel quality the network cannot audit. |
| 11.4 | Guarantee illusion. Holders read a ceiling as a promise and stop diligencing. | remove | No badge, no "verified" state, no marketing artefact (§03.1). The only output is a number with a timestamp, and §09.2 is contractual rather than advisory. | High. A framing risk; framing is the weakest tool available. |
| 11.5 | Regulatory reclassification. The network is judged a ratings agency, custodian, or insurer. | cap | Refusal-only interface, no opinions, no custody, capped guarantee — each is chosen because it narrows what the service can be said to be doing. | Unquantified. Jurisdiction-dependent and outside the specification's control. |
| 11.6 | Cold start. No emissions and no sale means no obvious first bond. | recover | Phase 1–2 run attestation-only with a verifier set of known operators under a published, explicit trust assumption — which is written into the epoch pack so nobody mistakes the early network for the final one. | High. The most likely reason this project does not exist in three years. |
| 11.7 | Bypass. An issuer integrates, then routes around the hook. | detect | Registration is revocable for future epochs, and the registry publishes the fact that an issuer stopped calling it — which is the only sanction available and is honest about being only that. | Medium. Strong with platforms, weak with unilateral issuers. |
| 11.8 | Single host-chain failure. The registry's host halts or reorganises. | cap | Ceiling reads are cached with TTL; a halt freezes issuance at the last committed value rather than authorising issuance at zero. | Low. Degrades to no new issuance, which is the safe direction. |
Two rows are marked High residual and they are not accidents: attester collusion (11.1) and the guarantee illusion (11.4). If either is unacceptable to you, this protocol does not solve your problem, and §15 says the same thing as a recommendation.
12 Security posture
A protocol that protects issuance cannot claim a security history it does not have. This section is a plan with named gaps, in the order the gaps have to close.
| Work | Phase | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Ceiling registry + mint hook | before Phase 1 | Not commissioned |
| Commit/blind-subset protocol | before Phase 1 | Not commissioned |
| Backstop tranche accounting | before Phase 4 | Not commissioned |
| Formal model of §04 arithmetic | Phase 2 | Spec draft only |
| Penetration test of attestation channel | Phase 2 | Not commissioned |
| Bug bounty | Phase 1 + 30 days | Terms not drafted |
| Key ceremony for the registry | Phase 1 | Procedure drafted |
No firm is named here on purpose. Naming an auditor before engaging one implies a relationship that does not exist, and a specification that borrows a reputation has already told you how it will treat evidence.
Three findings would stop Phase 1 rather than delay it: a way for an issuer to influence its own q without a counterparty noticing; a commit path that lets a verifier see another's result before signing; or a reserve accounting error that can make capacity look larger than it is. Any of those is a redesign, not a patch, and the gate is written down before the audit begins so the gate cannot be moved afterwards.
Output is a computed limit with published inputs, not an opinion with a letter attached. The distinction is load-bearing, which is why §15 forbids a rating scale even as a convenience for integrators.
No key, no withdrawal path, no freeze authority. If the network cannot move an asset it cannot be the reason an asset is missing, which is the single most valuable thing this design gives up in exchange for.
The backstop is a capped, loss-bearing reserve for one defined event, with the exclusions in §09.2 written into the terms rather than the marketing. Licensing analysis has to precede Phase 4 in every jurisdiction that reads it differently, and no such analysis has been commissioned yet — the entity record in the footer of every page says the same.
No token exists to sell and none is planned for sale in Phase 0–2, so this document can be read as engineering rather than as a prospectus. Published by Ztakora Pte. Ltd., Singapore; the registration number and the licensing analysis that Phase 4 depends on are both outstanding.
Each constraint above is enforced by an omission in the architecture, not by a policy page. That is deliberate: a compliance posture that depends on staff behaviour is a promise, and one that depends on the absence of a function is a fact a regulator can verify from the source.
13 Implementation roadmap
No dates. A phase advances when its gate holds, and the gate is a measurement, not a milestone.
This document, reviewed publicly. Registry types and the epoch-pack schema fixed as RFCs.
No bonds, no mint hook, no guarantee. The network publishes ceilings for synthetic books so the arithmetic can be attacked while it costs nothing.
Two or three consenting issuers, ceilings computed and published but not binding. The only question: would the line have stopped something real?
Mint hook enforced. Aggregate ceiling hard-capped at $250m and the backstop is empty — breaches are recorded, not paid.
Bonds posted, reserve funded to target, tranche accounting exercised by a rehearsed simulated breach before a real one can reach it.
Any issuer meeting the evidence classes. The cap lifts only if the reserve target has been met for 12 months.
False-attestation rate, measured as signed results contradicted by later evidence.
Median breach-detection-to-refusal latency.
Epoch commit success over a rolling 90 days.
Published packs reproducible by an outside analyst with the reference implementation.
False-refusal rate, reviewed jointly with each affected issuer.
Independent bonded verifiers, no single operator above 8%.
14 Worked example
Fictional, fully specified, reproducible. Every figure below follows from §04 with the parameters in Appendix A, so a reader can check the story rather than accept it.
Ridgeway Digital Notes issues a note series backed by a collateral book. It begins conservatively, then a corporate mandate pushes it into private credit — the asset class where the network has the least visibility and the most conservative decay curve. Nothing about the issuer's intentions changes. That is why the mechanism does not need them to.
The interesting part is what the protocol never does: it never calls the book insolvent, never freezes a token, and never asks anyone's permission to reduce protection. It just lowers a number until the mint stops.
Assume epoch 0 is a normal Tuesday, the mandate is reasonable, and no one is lying at the start.
| Epoch | Book | Σ covered | ci | Li | Liability | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | $60m bills + $40m corporate | 96.0 | 0.077 | 88.6 | 70.0 | mint ok |
| 4 | 35 / 35 / 30 — credit enters the book | 79.4 | 0.012 | 78.5 | 72.0 | mint ok |
| 9 | 20 / 30 / 50 — credit is now half the book | 68.4 | 0.028 | 66.5 | 74.0 | over line |
| 10 | unchanged | 68.4 | 0.028 | 66.5 | 74.0 | refused |
| 13 | Custodian silent — grace ends, q falls | 43.6 | 0.028 | 42.4 | 74.0 | refused |
| 15 | Redemption queue; assets sold stressed | — | — | 0.0 | 74.0 | shortfall |
| Books are stated as bills / corporate / private credit in $m. Every row is the §04 arithmetic on the Appendix A defaults, which means the table can be recomputed line by line. At epoch 9 the liability already exceeded the ceiling, and the protocol's only response is that no further note can be created. The queue at epoch 15 is the same event either way; what changed is that it arrived at $74m of outstanding liability rather than at $140m. | ||||||
| Realisable after stressed sale | Outstanding | Gap |
|---|---|---|
| 58.0 | 74.0 | 16.0 |
| Source, in order | Absorbs | Running uncovered |
|---|---|---|
| Issuer bond — 3% of the last committed ceiling, $66.5m at epoch 9, floored at $250k | 2.0 | 14.0 |
| Backstop first-loss tranche | 8.0 | 6.0 |
| Backstop senior tranche, capacity for this issuer | 6.0 | 0.0 |
| Shortfall ledger | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Holders are made whole on these inputs — and the useful reading is the opposite one: the reserve absorbed $14m of $16m, which is 87.5% of the capacity available to every issuer on the network. One book of this size drains it. §09's cap and §11.6's cold-start problem are the same problem seen from two sides. | ||
15 Decision brief
Fund Phase 1 and Phase 2 — attestation-only plus shadow mode against consenting issuers. Do not fund the backstop, the bond sizing, or any token work until the §13 Phase 2 gate has answered the only question that matters: would a line at this height have stopped something real? If the answer after 60 days of shadow data is no, the protocol should be withdrawn rather than repositioned.
Appendix Parameters, terms, sources
| Symbol | Meaning | Default | Range | Move via |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| p | Stress confidence behind zp | 0.99 | 0.95–0.995 | §10 gate |
| λ | Market-impact coefficient | per class | fitted | §10 gate |
| hcap | Haircut beyond which an asset is ineligible | 0.60 | fixed | not governable |
| γ | Concentration sensitivity | 0.35 | 0.10–0.60 | §10 gate |
| Htarget | Herfindahl at or below which c = 0 | 0.30 | 0.20–0.45 | §10 gate |
| cmax | Ceiling on the concentration penalty | 0.40 | fixed | not governable |
| ε | Verifier agreement tolerance | 1.5% | 0.5–3% | §10 gate |
| — | Commit quorum of bonded stake | 2/3 | fixed | not governable |
| — | Epoch length, host-chain equivalent | 24 h | 6–48 h | §10 gate |
| — | Reserve target and hard cap, of aggregate ceiling | 5% / 12% | cap fixed | not governable |
| — | Bond multiple over the misstateable ceiling | 1.2× | 1.0–2.0 | §10 gate |
| — | Issuer bond, of last committed ceiling | 3% | 2–8% | §10 gate |
Trackers disagree on RWA totals by more than a factor of three, for reasons that are legible rather than suspicious: whether fiat-backed stablecoins count, whether one asset bridged to four chains counts four times, and whether private credit is marked at par. [R1] carries the headline because it is the only figure read from a tracker rather than from a report about one, and [R2] against [R4] is left visible because two forecasts of the same market differing by 3× is itself the argument for measurement over narrative. No figure in §04, §08, §09 or §14 comes from outside this page: those are parameters and worked examples defined here, and saying so is what makes them checkable.
— Live deployment
Everything above this line is a design. Everything in this section is a fact about a running system, read from the address book the deployer wrote and from the chain itself. It is a testnet deployment of a protocol with no token, no partner and no audit, and it is presented as exactly that: the eight contracts below are live on Base Sepolia, the roles publish and audit against them every epoch, and the mechanism's central claim — that issuance above the line is refused — has been demonstrated on a rehearsal chain and is waiting on a funded quorum on this one.
| Component | Address | What it is responsible for | Code, bytes |
|---|---|---|---|
Ztakora | 0x95d4…cf15 | The root: the epoch clock, the load line, and the only place a mint is refused. | 20215 |
ParameterSet | 0xe65e…7868 | Epoch to parameter set, hashed, and changeable only through the controller. | 5953 |
BondRegistry | 0x8fd7…32c8 | Verifier stake, approvals and slashing — the bond a quorum is measured in. | 6139 |
AttestationRegistry | 0x8508…f037 | Blind commit, reveal, quorum, settlement: the evidence an epoch is built from. | 9109 |
LiabilityRegistry | 0x332c…0d87 | Books, series, issuer cover, and the mint and burn that stay inside the line. | 11552 |
Backstop | 0xc3f6…3b2d | The reserve: its cap, its fee, and the rules under which it releases. | 3119 |
ShortfallLedger | 0x1b4e…b225 | The part of a loss that could not be paid, named and remembered. | 3345 |
GovernanceGate | 0x9da5…79b9 | Endorsements, observation period, signal and band for every parameter change. | 6642 |
No explorer login, no API key, no trust in this page. An address with code is a contract; the code length is the compiler's; the calls are the roles'. The explorer will tell you the source is unverified — that is a publishing decision, not a missing deployment, and the contracts page says what verification would cost.
# 1. Does a contract live at the root address? ("0x" would answer: nothing here)
curl -s https://sepolia.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getCode","params":["0x95d445fad4d54e8e5f0375a75779bf79cdf4cf15","latest"]}'
# 2. Who created it, in which transaction, and is its source published?
curl -s https://base-sepolia.blockscout.com/api/v2/addresses/0x95d445fad4d54e8e5f0375a75779bf79cdf4cf15 \
| jq '{is_contract, creation_status, creator_address_hash, creation_transaction_hash, is_verified}'
# 3. The calls it has actually received
curl -s https://base-sepolia.blockscout.com/api/v2/addresses/0x95d445fad4d54e8e5f0375a75779bf79cdf4cf15/transactions \
| jq '.items[:5][] | {hash, block_number, timestamp, status, method}'
# 4. Every component in the book against the code this repository compiles
node state/check-code.mjs state/base-sepolia-v4.json https://sepolia.base.org
# 5. Protocol state, the same way the operator CLI reads it
node node/src/cli.ts status --rpc https://sepolia.base.org --book state/base-sepolia-v4.json --chain-id 84532One honesty note, because the section would be worth little without it. The root above is the 4th deployment on Base Sepolia, and the 3 before it still have code on the chain: the most recent, 0x8e8825389ab3e5d7a3e151efd2e915fe87d3f84e, created at block 50 958 156, then 0x3687…0f60 and 0xde00…cc5a. None of them are readable by a node built from this tree, because the strings a commitment is hashed over were renamed and those constants are load-bearing. A rename mints new addresses and the old ones stay on the chain, holding nothing. The generations, their domain strings and what is at each address are tabulated on the contracts page.
| Version | Date | Change |
|---|---|---|
| v0.9 | 2026-10-26 | First public draft. §04 haircuts made time-scaled rather than class-tabulated; §09 reserve cap reduced from 18% to 12% of aggregate ceiling after the §14 example showed a single book draining 87.5% of it; §09.3 adoption gate added after review that a limit nobody integrates is a report. |
Corrections are more useful than endorsements, and there is no published route to send one through: no inbox is staffed behind this site, and an address that bounces is worse than no address. When a reader establishes a mistake, the fix lands in the page it belongs to and in the changelog above. Every substantive change to a constant in Appendix A requires the §10 gate, including changes made because a reader pointed out an error.